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  Banks provide a substantial proportion of external finance to corporations around the 
globe (Mayer, 1988).  Yet, there have been no studies of whether international differences in 
bank supervision influence the obstacles that corporations face in raising external finance.   
This paper examines competing theories regarding which bank supervisory approaches 
work best to facilitate the flow of credit to firms.  Due to information and transaction costs, core 
theories of public policy and regulation imply that strong official supervision of banks can 
improve the corporate governance of banks (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Stigler, 1971).
1  This 
“official supervision view” holds that private agents frequently lack the information, incentives, 
and capabilities to monitor powerful firms and banks (Becker, 1968; Becker and Stigler; 1974).  
From this perspective a powerful supervisory agency will enhance corporate governance of 
banks, improve the incentives facing bank managers, and thereby boost the efficiency with 
which banks intermediate society’s savings.  The official supervision theory assumes that 
governments have both the expertise and the incentives to ameliorate information, enforcement, 
and transaction costs and improve corporate governance of banks. 
  An alternative to the official supervision view also draws on core theories of public 
policy and regulation.  The “political/regulatory capture view” argues that politicians do not 
maximize social welfare; they maximize their own welfare (Hamilton, et al., 1788; Buchanan 
and Tullock, 1962; Becker, 1983).  Thus, politicians may induce banks to divert the flow of 
credit to politically connected firms, or powerful banks may “capture” politicians and induce 
official supervisors to act in the best interests of banks rather than in the best interests of society 
                                                 
1 In a world with (i) no information or transactions costs, (ii) governments that maximize social welfare, and (iii) 
well-defined and efficiently enforced property rights, market participants will achieve efficient outcomes (Coase, 
1960).  If the prerequisites for this laissez-faire – invisible hand – theory hold, government supervision of banks 




(Becker and Stigler, 1974; Stigler, 1975; Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  This political/regulatory 
capture theory suggests that direct official supervision of banks may actually reduce the 
efficiency with which banks allocate credit.  Specifically, while powerful official supervision 
may increase the flow of credit to a few well-connected firms, the political/regulatory capture 
theory holds that powerful supervision will hurt the availability of credit to firms in general. 
  Economists have attempted to derive mechanisms that simultaneously recognize the 
importance of market failures, which motivate government intervention, and political failures, 
which suggest that politicians and regulators do not necessarily have incentives to ease market 
failures (Becker and Stigler, 1974).  From this perspective, the challenge is to create mechanisms 
that negate the “grabbing hand” of politicians while creating incentives for official agencies to 
improve social welfare (North, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Haber, 2003).
2   
  In the area of bank supervision, proponents of the “independent supervision view” 
argue that creating an independent agency is a useful mechanism for balancing market and 
political failures.  This view holds that if supervisors are independent from the government and if 
supervisors have proper incentives, then this reduces the likelihood that politicians will use the 
supervisory agency to induce banks to funnel credit to favored ends.  Similarly, if the 
supervisory agency is independent from banks and if supervisors have proper incentives, then 
this lowers the probability that banks will capture supervisors.  Thus, the independent 
supervision view proposes a compromise to create a supervisory agency that has the resources to 
overcome information asymmetries but that is sufficiently independent so that it avoids 
                                                 
2 Shleifer and Vishny (1998) use the phrase “grabbing hand” to describe the maximizing behavior of politicians in 
contrast to the “helping hand” view, which assumes that governments maximize social welfare.  These phrases 
contrast nicely with the “invisible hand” theory, which posits that with (i) no market frictions, (ii) social maximizing 




political/regulatory capture.  Under these conditions, independent supervision can enhance the 
corporate governance of banks and lower firms’ external financing obstacles. 
 The  “private empowerment view” takes a different approach to confronting information 
and enforcement costs while recognizing that politicians act in their own interests.  The private 
empowerment theory suggests that bank supervisory strategies should (1) focus on enhancing the 
ability and incentives of private agents to overcome informational barriers and exert corporate 
control over banks and (2) limit the power of official supervisors.  Thus, the “private 
empowerment” theory seeks to limit the powers of the supervisory agency so that the 
government is unable to use bank supervision to achieve political ends.  Simultaneously, the 
private empowerment theory seeks to provide the supervisor with sufficient power to force 
accurate information disclosure so that private agents can more easily monitor banks (Hay and 
Shleifer, 1998).  This will boost private monitoring of banks and thereby enhance the incentives 
of bank managers to allocate capital based on efficiency considerations (Grossman and Hart, 
1980).  Furthermore, this view argues that many empowered bank creditors will be less 
susceptible to capture by politicians and banks than a single government supervisory agency.  
Thus, special connections and corruption may play less of a role in countries that foster private 
monitoring.  Finally, a second component of the private empowerment view stresses incentives.  
Private creditors will more effectively exert corporate governance of banks and therefore 
enhance corporate financing if the government does not distort incentives through excessively 
generous deposit insurance. 
  This paper is further motivated by basic finance theory, banking sector policy concerns, 
and broad public policy debates.  Consider first corporate finance theory and core theories of 




with shareholders and other financiers, in easing financing constraints and exerting corporate 
governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Based on some of these models, new research 
examines how laws and regulations concerning shareholders influence corporate finance (e.g., La 
Porta et al., 2000).  Yet, there exists no corresponding work that examines how bank supervision 
influences corporate finance.  Also, core theories of financial intermediation provide a theoretical 
mechanism linking bank supervisory approaches to credit availability.  Calomiris and Kahn 
(1991), Flannery (1994), and Diamond and Rajan (2001) develop models in which the fragile 
structure of banks, i.e., liquid deposits and illiquid assets, serves as an effective commitment 
device that keeps banks from assuming excessive risks or from shirking on collecting payment 
from firms.  Put succinctly, the sequential service constraint on bank deposits creates a collective 
action problem among depositors that induces depositors to run if they acquire information that 
the bank is not monitoring firms and managing risk appropriately.  In this context, generous 
deposit insurance impedes the commitment device (threat of a run) and raises barriers to firm 
financing (Diamond and Rajan, 2001).  Similarly, supervisory policies that induce greater 
information disclosure by banks will enhance the commitment mechanism and facilitate external 
finance.  This paper is an initial attempt to understand how different supervisory strategies affect 
the obstacles faced by firms in raising external finance.  
  Second, bank supervision is frequently discussed in the context of avoiding banking 
crises.  However, crises cannot be the only criterion because policymakers can essentially 
eliminate banking crises through a 100 percent reserve requirement.  Thus, an important 
objective of bank supervision – though often under-stated – is to foster efficient capital 
allocation; i.e., to finance worthy firms.  This is the first paper to assess the impact of bank 




  Finally, this paper provides information on a broad public policy issue.  In a host of 
circumstances, policymakers face the question, should governments do nothing, empower the 
private sector, or directly oversee private activities?  This paper addresses this concern by 
conducting an investigation of different bank supervisory approaches. 
This paper uses firm-level data on almost 5,000 firms across 49 countries to examine the 
impact of bank supervision on the obstacles that firms encounter in raising external capital.  The 
firm-level data comes from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), which was 
conducted in 1999.   This dataset includes information on firm characteristics, including (i) the 
obstacles that firms face in raising capital, (ii) the degree to which special connections are 
important to raising bank loans, and (iii) the degree to which bank corruption is important to 
raising capital.  These data are based on survey questions in which firms rank the impediments 
on a scale from one to four, in which larger values imply greater obstacles and greater needs for 
special connections and corruption.  The dataset has extensive coverage of small firms, which 
distinguishes it from other cross-country studies of financing constraints that rely on data from 
large corporations. 
The bank supervisory data are for 1999 and come from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2003, 
henceforth BCL).  This database includes information on the official supervisory power, such as 
the ability to intervene banks, replace managers, force provisioning, stop dividends and other 
payments, acquire information, etc.  BCL also have information on the degree of supervisory 
independence from the government and whether banks can sue bank supervisors.  BCL collect 
information on the empowerment of the private sector.  This includes information on whether 
bank directors and officials face criminal prosecution for failure to accurately disclose 




accounting firms audit banks, etc.  Finally, to measure incentives facing private creditors, we use 
data on the deposit insurance system from Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2003). 
Econometrically, we use an ordered probit, where the dependent variable is either 
financing obstacles faced by firms, the need for special connections, or the extent of corruption 
in raising external finance.  The main explanatory variables are measures of (1) official 
supervisory power, (2) the independence of the official supervisory agency from the government 
and banks, (3) the degree to which the bank regulations facilitate private monitoring of banks, 
and (4) the generosity of the deposit insurance regime to measure the incentives of the private 
sector to monitor banks.  In assessing the impact of bank supervision strategies on the financing 
obstacles faced by firms, we also control for a range of firm-specific traits and numerous country 
specific characteristics, such as inflation, economic growth, and overall financial development.  
In the sensitivity analyses, we further control for state-ownership of banks, regulatory restrictions 
on bank activities, minority shareholder rights, and checks and balances in the political system. 
The results are inconsistent with the official supervision view and supportive of the 
political/regulatory capture view.  Specifically, official supervisory power is positively 
associated with the financing obstacles faced by firms and positively associated with both special 
connections and corruption in raising external finance.  Even after controlling for firm-specific 
traits and country-specific factors, the results suggest that official supervisory power hinders 
external financing opportunities and raises the need for special connections and corruption. 
The data also lend support to the independent supervision view.  In particular, when the 
supervisory agency is independent, this is associated with lower obstacles to obtaining external 
finance.  Moreover, independence reduces the negative effects from powerful supervision.  As 




the highest levels of supervisory independence.  More specifically, as the supervisory agency 
becomes more independent from the government, this mitigates the positive impact that powerful 
official supervision has on firms’ reliance on special connections and corruption. Thus, the 
results suggest that independence tends to reduce political control of the supervisory authority 
and hence political manipulation of the flow of credit to firms. 
The paper also presents evidence that supports the private empowerment view.  
Regulations that force accurate information disclosure lower obstacles to firm financing and 
lower the impression that corruption of bank officials is important for raising external finance.  
Furthermore, moral hazard – as measured by the generosity of the deposit insurance system – is 
also important.  Greater moral hazard tends to raise the corporate financing obstacles faced by 
firms. The data are consistent with the view that governments that force accurate information 
disclosure to the private sector and do not distort the incentives of banks through excessively 
generous insurance of bank liabilities will tend to lower financing obstacles. 
This paper is related to recent research.  BCL (2003) conduct a purely cross-country 
analysis and find that financial development is (1) positively associated with supervisory 
approaches that empower private monitoring of banks and (2) negatively associated with 
powerful supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks.  In this paper, we use microeconomic 
data to examine the channels running from bank supervision to corporate finance, rather than 
examining the cross-country connections between bank supervision and banking system size.  In 
a pure cross-country analysis, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find that securities 
market regulations that empower private monitoring of corporations promote stock market 




promote equity market capitalization in countries with efficient government bureaucracies.
3  In 
this paper, we focus on bank supervision and use firm-level data in assessing whether national 
approaches to bank supervision influence firms’ financing obstacles. 
A number of methodological concerns need to be noted.  First, individual firms 
subjectively report financing obstacles.  Thus a firm facing the same obstacles in two different 
countries may report different obstacles for reasons that do not depend on actual constraints.  
Although it is not clear that this would bias the results in any particular direction, we provide 
evidence on the validity of the survey information below.  Second, this paper faces the problem 
that the supervisory variables might proxy for some other country specific factor.  Importantly, 
however, we get the same results when including official supervisory power and the private 
empowerment variables simultaneously.  Thus, supervisory power and private monitoring are not 
proxying for the same unspecified factor.  Also, the results hold even when controlling for many 
economic growth, macroeconomic stability, overall financial development, differences in 
political systems, state-ownership of banks, regulatory restrictions on bank activities, laws 
governing the rights of shareholders, and the degree to which the state controls or represses the 
media.  Third, simultaneity bias may influence the results.  For instance, the banking crises may 
raise financing obstacles and boost official supervisory power.  When we control for the 
presence of systemic banking crisis, however, this does not change the findings.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the data and the 
methodology is described in Section 3.  Section 4 gives the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 There is a literature on balancing law and regulations to enhance securities market operations.  Glaeser, Johnson, 
and Shleifer (2001) provide theory and examples concerning the incentives facing judges and regulators in 




2. Data and Summary Statistics 
a.  Obstacles to firms obtaining external finance: Definitions 
To examine the relationship between bank supervisory strategies and corporate financing 
obstacles, we use data from two main sources: the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
for firm-level data and BCL (2001a,b, 2003) for country-level data on bank supervision. 
From the WBES firm-level survey data, we use information on almost 5,000 firms across 
49 countries.  While the WBES comprises 80 countries and the BCL database includes data on 
107 countries, there is limited overlap, which reduces our sample to 49 countries.  The WBES 
surveyed firms of all sizes; small firms (between 5 and 50 employees) represent 40% of the 
sample, medium-sized (between 51 and 500 employees) firms are 40% of the sample, and the 
remaining 20% are large firms (more than 500 employees).  The survey comprises mostly firms 
of the manufacturing, construction and services sectors.  We also have information on whether 
these are government-owned, foreign-owned, or privately-owned domestic firms.  The data 
indicate whether the firm is an exporter and provide information on firm employment, sales, 
industry, growth, financing patterns, and the number of competitors.  
  Financing Obstacles are measured by using responses to the following question: “How 
problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 
1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle).  Table 1 shows 
that perceived financing obstacles do not only vary across firms within a country, but also across 
countries. Portuguese firms rate financing obstacles as relatively insignificant (1.73), while firms 
in Moldova rate financing obstacles as more than moderate (3.44).  Overall, 35% of the firms in 
                                                                                                                                                             
increased use of regulation in the United States, while Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) develop a theory and provide 




our sample rate financing as major obstacle, 27% as a moderate obstacle, 19% as a minor 
obstacle, and 20% as no obstacle.  
Apart from this general financing obstacle, firms were also asked about the need for 
special connections (Special Connection) and corruption of bank officials (Bank Corruption) 
in obtaining external funding.  Answers vary between one and four, where higher values indicate 
a greater needs for special connections and corruption.  Table 2 provides summary statistics and 
indicates that general financing obstacles is positively correlated with the needs for special 
connections and corruption to obtain financing. 
b. Obstacles to firms obtaining external finance: Justification 
The corporate finance literature has used several different approaches to identify firms 
that are constrained (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997).  Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) use a 
priori reasoning to argue that low-dividend firms are constrained. Rajan and Zingales (1998) use 
the external financing patterns by US firms as a benchmark for the “natural” dependence of 
industries on external financing. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) rely on a financial 
planning model to identify firms that have access to long-term external financing.  
We use survey responses as indicators of the incidence and severity of financial obstacles 
for four reasons.  First, the survey acquires direct information from firms about perceived 
obstacles and therefore does not infer the existence of financing constraints from other 
information.  Second, the survey data not only has information on general financing obstacles.  It 
also provides information on the specific types of obstacles that firms face, e.g., special 
connections or corruption.  Third, the WBES database has excellent coverage of small and 




heavily on large corporations.  Finally, the WBES has very broad country coverage that is 
important for linking the firm-level data with the bank supervision data. 
As noted in the Introduction, using data based on self-reporting by firms may produce 
concerns that a firm facing the same obstacles will respond to questions differently in different 
institutional and cultural environments.  If this were pure measurement error, it would bias the 
results against finding a relationship between bank supervision and firm financing obstacles. 
While problems with survey data may bias the results against this paper’s conclusions, 
we (a) control for many country-specific traits in our analyses and (b) present four pieces of 
information that support the validity of the survey data.  First, Hellman et al. (2000) show that in 
a sub-sample of 20 countries there is a close connection between responses and measurable 
outcomes.  They find no systematic bias in the survey responses. 
Second, reported firm financing obstacles are highly, negatively correlated with firm 
growth.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2002) show that the negative impact of 
reported financing obstacles on firm growth hold after controlling for many factors and using 
instrumental variables to control for endogeneity.  Thus, firms’ responses to the survey on 
financing obstacles are capturing more than idiosyncratic differences in how firms rank 
obstacles. 
Third, we examined the connection between reported firm financing obstacles and 
Wurgler’s (2000) measure of the efficiency of investment flows. This is an investment elasticity 
that gauges the extent to which a country increases investment in growing industries and 
decreases investment in declining ones.  We find the reported financing obstacles are negatively 
and significantly correlated with this efficiency of investment indicator.  Again, the survey data 




Fourth, we study the link between survey responses regarding firm financing obstacles 
and industrial expansion.  Based on Rajan and Zingales (1998), we examine whether industries 
that are naturally heavy users of external finance grow faster in economies that face lower 
reported financing obstacles.  Thus, we use the same data and specification employed by Rajan 
and Zingales (1998).  We find that externally dependent industries grow faster in countries where 
firms report lower obstacles.  While these observations certainly do not eliminate concerns about 
the survey data, they suggest that the reported obstacles are closely associated with (i) the growth 
of externally dependent industries, (ii) the efficient flow of investment, and (iii) firm growth. 
c. Firm-specific traits 
In our analysis of bank supervision and corporate finance, we control for several firm 
attributes such as ownership.  Government takes on the value one if the government owns any 
percentage of the firm, and Foreign takes on the value one if foreign entities own any fraction of 
the firm.
4  Our sample includes 12% government owned firms and 20% foreign firms.  
We also control for each firm’s business, competitive environment, and size.  The 
regressions include dummy variables for whether the firm is an exporting firm (Exporter), 
whether it is a manufacturing firm (Manufacturing), and whether it is a service sector firm 
(Services).  The analyses also include the log of the number of competitors that each firm faces 
(Number of Competitors).  In sum, 36% of the firms in our sample are in manufacturing and 
46% in service, and on average they face 2.3 competitors.  Finally, we include the log of sales in 
USD as indicator of size (Sales), which ranges from –2.12 to 25.3, with an average of 12.   
                                                 
4 While these simple zero-one indicators of ownership may not capture the varying degrees of influence that arise 
from different levels of government or foreign ownership, information on the percentage of ownership is available 
for less than 10 percent of the sample.  However, among the firms for which we have data on the percentage of 
foreign and government ownership, more than two thirds of firms with foreign ownership are majority foreign 




The correlation analysis in Table 2 Panel B indicates that government-owned firms, 
domestically owned firms, non-exporting firms, smaller firms (as measured by sales), and firms 
with more competitors suffer more financing obstacles. 
d.  Bank supervisory policies 
We use four indicators of supervisory practices to test the empirical validity of the 
competing hypotheses outlined in the Introduction.   
Official Supervisory Power indicates whether the supervisory authorities have the 
authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems in banks.  This indicator is 
constructed from 14 dummy variables that indicate whether bank supervisors can take specific 
actions against external auditors, bank management and bank shareholders both in normal times 
and times of distress. The exact definition is provided in the data appendix. We use the first 
principal component indicator of these variables, which varies between –3.05 (Singapore) and 
1.14 (U.S.) with a mean of –0.08, and higher values indicating wider authority for bank 
supervisors.
5   
Supervisory Independence indicates independence of supervisors from both banks and 
the government.  Supervisory Independence-Banks is a dummy variable that indicates whether 
supervisors are legally protected against lawsuits brought by banks.  Supervisory 
Independence-Government is the sum of three dummy variables indicating the involvement of 
government in appointment, control and removal of supervisors.  Supervisory Independence is 
the sum of the individual indicators.  We examine Supervisory Independence, Supervisory 
Independence-Banks and Supervisory Independence-Government. 
                                                 
5 The mean is not exactly equal to zero because we use the raw data available from Barth et al. (2003)on the 





Regarding the theories discussed in the Introduction, the official supervision view 
predicts a negative relation between Financing Obstacles and Official Supervisory Power.
6  In 
contrast, the political/regulatory capture view predicts a positive relationship between Financing 
Obstacles and Supervisory Power.  The independent supervision view predicts a negative 
relation between Supervisory Independence and financing obstacles and also predicts that 
independence will reduce the adverse impact of supervisory power on Financing Obstacles. 
We use two indicators to measure the tools and incentives of private bank creditors to 
monitor banks and exercise market discipline.  
Private Monitoring is designed to measure the degree to which bank supervision forces 
banks to disclose accurate information to the public and induces private sector monitoring of 
banks.  Private Monitoring is constructed from nine dummy variables that measure whether bank 
directors and officials are legally liable for the accuracy of information disclosed to the public, 
whether banks must publish consolidated accounts, whether banks must be rated and audited, 
whether banks must be audited by certified international auditors, and whether subordinated debt 
is allowable (which may create a class of private monitors). The Private Monitoring Index is 
constructed as principal component indicator, with higher values indicating more tools and 
incentives for private bank creditors to monitor banks, ranging from –1.83 (Moldova) to 1.46 
(United Kingdom).  
Moral Hazard, a principal component indicator, measures the generosity of the deposit 
insurance scheme and thus proxies for the incentives or the lack thereof for private bank 
                                                 
6 See Polinsky and Shavell’s (2000) review of the theory of public enforcement and the discussion in Coase (1988).  
Also, Spiller and Ferejohn (1992) note that lawmakers do not have sufficient information to anticipate all possible 
circumstances.  Thus, there may be efficiency gains to delegating power to a supervisory agency that has the 




creditors to monitor banks.  As noted, the Appendix provides the precise definitions of Moral 
Hazard and the Private Monitoring variables.  
In terms of theory, the private empowerment view predicts a negative relationship 
between Private Monitoring and financing obstacles.  The private empowerment view predicts a 
positive link between Moral Hazard and the degree of external financing obstacles.   As 
emphasized, the private empowerment theory presumes that there are market failures and that 
these market failures can be ameliorated though information disclosure that facilitates private 
sector monitoring, not by direct official monitoring of banks. 
d. Country-level control variables 
 To assess the robustness of the relation between bank supervision and firms’ access to 
external financing, we include other country-level variables. We include the growth rate of GDP 
per capita (Growth) since firms in faster growing countries are expected to grow faster and face 
lower obstacles.  We use the inflation rate (Inflation) to proxy for monetary instability, 
conjecturing that firms in more stable environments face fewer obstacles and grow faster (Boyd, 
Smith, and Levine, 2001).   
We also include the level of financial development (Priv), which measures bank credit to 
the private sector as a share of GDP.  We include financial development to assess the impact of 
supervision on corporate finance independent of overall financial development.  Overall financial 
development is positively associated with economic and firm performance (King and Levine, 
1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).  Thus, we examine the independent impact of bank 
supervision on the financing obstacles faced by firms after controlling for overall financial 




Firms in countries with higher inflation, lower financial development, less independent 
supervisors and less private monitoring report higher financing obstacles (Table 2 Panel C). 
  In our sensitivity analyses, we run regressions including a variety of legal and 
institutional indicators and a dummy variable indicating the occurrence of systemic banking 
crisis.  Specifically, we control for (i) Checks and Balances in the political process, i.e., the 
number of veto players in the political system; (ii) Banking Freedom, which measures the 
absence of government regulatory restrictions on bank activities; (iii) State-Owned Banks, which 
equals the share of a country’s bank assets that are held by banks that are more than 50 percent 
government owned; (iv) Shareholder Rights, which is a measure of the legal rights of minority 
shareholders vis-à-vis management and large shareholders and (v) the occurrence of a Systemic 
Banking Crisis.  The Appendix defines each of these variables in detail and we discuss the use of 
these variables further when we present the sensitivity analyses. 
 
3.  The Empirical Model 
To examine the relationship between bank supervision and corporate finance, we use the 
following regression: 
 
Financing Obstaclej,k = α + β1 Governmentj,k + β2 Foreignj,k + β3 Exporterj,k + β4 No. of 
Competitorsj,k + β5 Manufacturingj,k + β6 Servicesj,k + β7 Sizej,k + β8Inflationk + β9 Growthk + 
β10Privk +β11 Supervisionk + εj,k.             ( 1 )  
The j and k subscripts indicate firm and country respectively.  The variable Supervision 
in equation (1) represents one – or more – of the various supervision variables discussed earlier.  




Given that Financing Obstacle is a polychotomous dependent variable with a natural 
order, we use the ordered probit model to estimate regression (1).  We assume that the 
disturbance parameter ε is normally distributed and use standard maximum likelihood 
estimation.
7  The coefficients, however, cannot be interpreted as marginal effects of a one-unit 
increase in the independent variable on the dependent variable, given the non-linear structure of 
the model.  Rather, the marginal effect is calculated as φ(β’x)β, where φ is the standard normal 
density at β’x.  We use the same estimation procedure when using (a) the importance of special 
connections for obtaining external finance (Special Connection) and (b) the importance of bank 




A. Initial  Findings 
The results in Table III suggest that (1) firms in countries with powerful supervisors face 
higher financing obstacles and (2) firms in countries with strong private monitoring and lower 
moral hazard face lower financing obstacles.  These results are consistent with the 
political/regulatory capture view, but inconsistent with the official supervision view.  These 
findings also support the private empowerment view since firms face lower financing obstacles 
in countries where private bank creditors have the tools and incentives to monitor banks. Official 
Supervisory Power and Moral Hazard enter significantly and positively in the regressions of 
General Financing Obstacle, while Private Monitoring Index enters significantly and negatively.   
The results also support the independent supervision view.  The independence of bank 
supervisors is negatively related with financing obstacles (column 2), and it helps alleviate the 
                                                 




adverse effect of official supervisory power (column 3).  Indeed, at the maximum level of 
supervisory independence (4), the marginal impact of additional supervisory power is zero.  The 
results also indicate that supervisory independence is particularly important for reducing 
financing obstacles when bank supervisors have extensive powers.
8  
The effect of supervisory practices on firms’ financing obstacles is not only statistically 
significant, but also economically relevant.  Table IV provides information on the change in the 
probability that a firm rates financing obstacles as major (i.e., the probability that a firm rates 
financial obstacles as a four) when changing bank supervisory policies.  In other words, using the 
coefficient estimates from Table III, we examine the impact of changing bank supervisory 
policies from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile on the probability that a firm will rank 
financing obstacles as major.  As we move from the country at the 25
th percentile of Official 
Supervisory Power to the country at the 75
th percentile, the probability that a firm rates financing 
as major obstacle increases from 33% to 38%, compared to the sample mean of 35%.  The 
probability decreases from 38% to 20% and 38% to 30% in the case of Supervisory 
Independence and Private Monitoring respectively. As another example, consider Chile and 
Canada.  The Table III regression estimates indicate that if Chile had the Official Supervisory 
Power of Canada (-2.15) instead of its own level (0.05), there would be a nine percent decrease 
in the probability that Chilean firms rank financing obstacles as extreme.  If Chile had the 
Supervisory Independence of Canada (4) instead of the current value in Chile (1), the regression 
estimates predict that there would be a 53 percent drop in the probability that Chilean firms rank 
financing obstacles as extremely high.  Finally, the coefficient estimates on Private Monitoring 
                                                                                                                                                             
model.  However, it is difficult to justify the preference of one over the other, and in practice, the two models seem 




indicate that if Chile had the private monitoring values of Canada (1.05 instead of 0.29), there 
would be a six percent drop in the probability that Chilean firms rank financing obstacles as 
major. 
B.  Robustness of the Initial Findings 
Table V confirms our finding for the sub-sample of firms that actually received bank 
financing. Our sample might contain firms that have not applied for bank credit, either because 
they feel discouraged or because they do not see the need.  Excluding firms that have not 
received bank finance does not change our results.  Official Supervisory Power and Moral 
Hazard enter significantly and positively, while Supervisory Independence and Private 
Monitoring enter significantly and negatively.  The interaction of Official Supervisory Power 
and Supervisory Independence enters significantly and negatively, indicating that supervisory 
independence alleviates the adverse effect of supervisory power.  
The relationship between supervisory practices and financing obstacles is robust to 
controlling for other legal and institutional variables and the occurrence of banking crisis (Table 
VI).  Here we include Checks and Balances, Banking Freedom, State-Owned Banks, Shareholder 
Rights and a dummy variable indicating a systemic banking crisis in the country during the 
1990s.  We confirm all of the results reported above when controlling for either the extent to 
which the political system impedes the exercise of power by one part of government (Checks and 
Balances, Panel A) or regulatory restrictions on bank activities (Banking Freedom, Panel B). 
Unsurprisingly, state-ownership of banks is highly, positively correlated with supervisory power.  
Thus, when we include the State-owned bank variable, neither supervisory power nor state-
owned banks enters independently significantly (Panel C).  All the other results hold.  We also 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 The bulk of the paper uses linear regressions.  We experimented with including quadratic terms for official 




find that shareholder rights, i.e., the degree to which the law protects the rights of minority 
shareholders against large shareholders and management, enters negatively and significantly 
(Panel D).  Stronger shareholder rights reduce external financing obstacles.  We also see a 
weakening of the link between supervisory power and financing obstacles when controlling for 
shareholder rights.  This is consistent with the view that when savers have greater legal 
protection as equity holders, they feel more comfortable providing equity finance so that firms 
have easier access to non-bank forms of external finance.  All the other results on private 
monitoring and moral hazard hold when controlling for shareholder rights.
9 Finally, our results 
hold when controlling for the occurrence of a systemic banking crisis in the country (Panel E).  
Conceivably, a banking crisis could increase the financing obstacles facing firms and change 
supervisory policies.  While we do find that systemic crises are associated with firms perceiving 
greater financing obstacles, this paper’s core results hold.  Overall, the data support the 
supervisory independence and private empowerment view, and are inconsistent with the official 
supervision view. 
We also conducted further robustness checks on the negative impact of supervisory 
power and the positive effects of supervisory independence by controlling or the competitiveness 
of the political system and the freedom of the media.  Specifically, we ran regressions where we 
include supervisory power and independence and their interaction as well as indicators of (i) 
competitiveness of legislative elections, (ii) degree of state ownership of media, and (iii) degree 
to which the state represses media (Table VII Panel A).  While the competitiveness of legislative 
elections and absence of state ownership and repression of media decreases financing obstacles, 
controlling for these effects does not change (i) the positive impact of supervisory power on 
                                                                                                                                                             
power and private monitoring, we find that the direct effects do not change in these non-linear specifications. 




financing obstacles, (ii) the negative impact of supervisory independence, and (iii) the 
dampening impact of supervisory independence on the relation between supervisory power and 
financing obstacles.   
We also include interaction terms between supervisory power and indicators of political 
and media openness.  Thus, we assess whether political openness and media openness ameliorate 
the negative impact of supervisory power (Table VII Panel B).  We find that state ownership and 
repression of media exacerbates the impact of supervisory power on financing obstacles. Thus, 
empowering the supervisory authority in countries with high levels of state-ownership of the 
media and state repression of the media is likely to aggravate the financing obstacles faced by 
firms. 
C.  Simultaneous Examination of the Bank Supervision Indicators 
In Table VIII, several of the bank supervision variables are included simultaneously.  
Specifically, we include (i) Official Supervisory Power, or Supervisory Independence and (ii) 
Private Monitoring or Moral Hazard.  We also include Private Monitoring and Moral Hazard in 
the same regression to assess whether both components of the private empowerment view 
independently influence firm financing obstacles.   
When including the bank supervision variables simultaneously, we again find evidence 
that is inconsistent with the official supervision view, but consistent with both the 
political/regulatory capture view and the private empowerment view.  Supervisory power tends 
to be associated with greater financing obstacles.  Independence of the supervisory authority is 
associated with lower obstacles.   
The data further indicate that Private Monitoring enters significantly and negatively, 




components of the private empowerment view: private agents can more effectively exert 
corporate control over banks if they have the tools (high levels of Private Monitoring) and sound 
incentives (low levels of Moral Hazard).  
D.  Channels: Special Connections and Corruption 
Next, we turn to the channels through which supervision operates.  We examine whether 
supervision influences external financing constraints by raising the need for special connections 
and corruption in raising capital.  Thus, we use alternatively the variables measuring (1) the 
importance of special connections and (2) the importance of bank corruption in obtaining 
external finance. 
The Table IX results indicate that firms in countries with more powerful and less 
independent supervisors are more likely to report the need of special connections for obtaining 
corporate finance. While the official supervision view posits the need for powerful official 
supervision to minimize favoritism and nepotism in banks’ lending decisions, the 
political/regulatory capture view holds that politicians or banks will capture official supervisors 
and thus increase the likelihood of favoritism and nepotism.   
Official Supervisory Power enters significantly and positively, supporting the 
political/regulatory capture view.  Supervisory Independence also enters significantly and 
negatively, suggesting the beneficial effects of an independent supervisory agency. Finally, note 
that the interaction of Official Supervisory Power and Supervisory Independence enters 
significantly and negatively.  Thus, independence reduces the negative effects of having a 
powerful supervisory agency.  These results are consistent with the Political/Regulatory Capture 




The Table X results indicate that firms in countries with more powerful and less 
independent supervisors are also more likely to report that corruption of bank officials is 
important for raising corporate financing. Official Supervisory Power enters significantly and 
positively, which again runs counter to the Official Supervisory theory.  Supervisory 
Independence enters significantly and negatively.  These results are consistent with the 
political/regulatory view, but inconsistent with the official supervision view. Furthermore, 
Private Monitoring enters significantly and negatively, which suggests that empowering private 
monitoring of banks tends to reduce the importance of corruption in raising external funds.  
Thus, the results lend support to the political/regulatory capture view, the private empowerment 
view, and the independent supervision view and run counter to the official supervision view. 
E.  More on Independence 
Table XI underlines the importance of supervisory independence from both the 
government and banks.  Here, we break apart the two components of the Supervisory 
Independence index separately into supervisory independence from banks (Supervisory 
Independence-Banks) and supervisory independence from the government (Supervisory 
Independence-Government).  We then examine the independent effects of these two components 
of supervisory independence in the regressions.   
We find that supervisory independence from the government and banks decreases general 
financing obstacles. Furthermore, independence from banks has a direct, negative impact on both 
the need for special connections and bank corruption in raising capital.  
We also find evidence that supervisory independence from the government helps 
alleviate the effect of official supervisory power on the general financing obstacles faced by 




Supervisory Power enters with a negative and significant coefficient.  Similarly, the Table XI 
regressions indicate that supervisory independence from the government also reduces the effect 
of supervisory power on the need for firms to have special connection in order to raise funds 
from banks.  Official Supervisory Power enters positively and significantly in all regressions.  
Again, these results are inconsistent with the official supervision view and underline the 
importance of an independent supervisory body to avoid both political and regulatory capture. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  This paper provides evidence on different theories of bank supervision.  The results 
provide four tentative conclusions about which bank supervisory practices work best to ease the 
external financing obstacles faced by firms. 
  First, we examined whether strong official supervision of banks facilitates corporate 
finance.  Here, the answer is a resounding no.  Countries with stronger bank supervisory agencies 
– countries where supervisory agencies can intervene banks, replace managers, force 
provisioning, stop dividends, etc. – tend to have firms that face greater financing obstacles than 
firms in countries where the supervisory agency is less powerful.  Even after controlling for 
firms-specific traits and country-specific characteristics, we find that supervisory power hinders 
external financing opportunities and raises the need for special connections and corruption.  The 
results are inconsistent with theories that hold that official supervisory agencies will promote 
social welfare by overcoming the information and enforcement costs faced by private agents.  
Rather, these findings are consistent with the view that politicians will use powerful supervisory 




“capture” politicians and induce bank supervisors to support the interests of banks, not the 
interests of society  (Stigler, 1975; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
  Second, we evaluate whether creating an independent supervisory agency mitigates the 
adverse effects of having a powerful official regulator.  We find evidence consistent with this 
view.  Greater supervisory independence from the government and from banks tends to lower 
impediments to obtaining external finance.  Furthermore, independence reduces the negative 
effects from power supervision.  As independence rises, the negative impact of powerful 
supervision on firm financing obstacles dissipates.  Specifically, as supervisory independence 
from the government rises, the adverse impact of powerful supervision on firms’ reliance on 
special connections and corruption in raising capital falls.  These findings are consistent with the 
view that supervisory independence moderates political control of the supervisory agency and 
therefore reduces political manipulation of the flow of credit to firms. 
  Third, we examine whether bank supervisory strategies that focus on empowering the 
private sector facilitate corporate finance.  The answer is yes.  In countries where bank 
supervision forces accurate information disclosure by banks and eases private monitoring of 
banks, firms tend to face lower obstacles to raising external finance.  We also find that greater 
moral hazard – as measured by the generosity of the deposit insurance regime – tends to raise the 
financing obstacles faced by firms.  The results support the view that forcing accurate 
information disclosure and not distorting the incentives of private agents tends to lower financial 
obstacles.  These findings are consistent with approaches that simultaneously recognize that 
private agents face substantive information and enforcement costs when monitoring banks, while 
also recognizing that politicians and regulators will act in their own interests and not necessarily 




  Finally, at a very general level, these results emphasize the importance of both market 
and political failures.  Bank supervision clearly matters.  Bank supervisory policies that seek to 
ameliorate market failures by forcing the accurate disclosure of information reduce the obstacles 
that firms face in raising external finance.  This is not a laissez faire – invisible hand – finding.  
This result suggests that active bank supervision can help ease information and enforcement 
costs and enhance corporate finance.  Just as clearly, however, the results highlight the 
importance of theories that emphasize that politicians act in their own interests.  Countries with 
powerful bank supervisors tend to have firms that face (i) greater financing obstacles and (ii) 
greater reliance on special connections and corruption in raising capital.  Thus, mechanisms that 
simultaneously recognize the importance of market and political failures – such as creating bank 
supervisory agencies that focus on forcing accurate information disclosure by banks and easing 
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Financing Obstacles and Supervisory Practice across Countries 
General Financing Obstacle is the response to the question “How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary 
between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Supervisory Power indicates the power of the supervisor vis-à-
vis banks; Supervisory Independence the independence of the bank supervisor from government and banks.   Private Monitoring is the amount of 
information available to bank creditors and Moral Hazard indicates the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme.  Detailed variable definitions and sources 










Argentina 3.03 -0.30 1 1.13 
Belarus 3.28 -2.24 4 -1.55 
Bolivia 3.04 0.22 2 0.06 
Botswana 2.34 0.82 2 0.97 -2.49
Brazil 2.71 1.00 1 0.97 
Canada 2.07 -2.15 4 1.05 2.86
Chile 2.43 0.05 1 0.29 2.20
China 3.34 0.28 1 1.05 
Croatia 3.34 0.17 2 0.29 
Czech Republic  3.13 1.00 1 -0.03 
Egypt 3.00 0.38 4 -0.13 -2.49
El Salvador  2.87 0.09 1 0.29 -2.49
Estonia 2.49 0.27 1 0.29 
France 2.76 -1.16 3 0.69 1.16
Germany 2.54 -0.91 4 0.97 1.93
Ghana 3.07 -0.09 4 -1.56 1.71
Guatemala 2.97 -0.42 1 -1.14 -2.49
Honduras 2.85 0.82 2 -0.42 -2.49
Hungary 2.67 1.00 2 -0.43 
India 2.54 -0.36 3 -0.42 2.95
Indonesia 2.86 0.74 2 0.25 -2.49
Italy 2.11 -1.66 2 1.27 2.09
Kenya 2.84 1.00 2 -1.00 3.41
Lithuania 2.88 -0.34 2 0.29 
Malawi 2.74 -0.10 2 -1.25 -2.49
Malaysia 2.65 -0.25 3 0.55 -2.49
Mexico 3.40 -0.17 1 -0.43 3.98
Moldova 3.44 -0.18 2 -1.83 
Namibia 1.91 -0.54 -0.13 
Nigeria 3.14 0.61 2 0.39 3.09
Panama 2.18 1.14 3 -0.13 -2.49
Peru 3.04 0.09 3 0.29 2.34
Philippines 2.68 0.95 1 -0.63 3.33
Poland 2.41 0.58 3 0.29 
Portugal 1.73 1.00 4 0.97 -2.49
Romania 3.30 -0.71 1 0.42 
Russia 3.22 -0.40 2 -1.25 
Singapore 1.85 -3.05 3 0.35 -2.49
Slovenia 2.29 1.00 4 -0.43 
South Africa  2.45 -2.95 2 0.77 -2.49
Spain 2.24 -0.32 3 0.97 
Sweden 1.89 -1.55 3 0.69 -2.49
Thailand 3.11 0.72 2 -0.42 -2.49
Trinidad & Tobago  3.03 -0.91 2 -0.43 
Turkey 3.13 -0.30 4 0.69 3.45
United Kingdom  2.25 0.59 4 1.46 0.73
United States  2.33 1.14 4 0.97 3.39
Venezuela 2.49 1.14 3 -0.43 2.52






Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
Summary statistics are presented in Panel A and correlations in Panel B and C, respectively. General Financing Obstacle is the response to the 
question “How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor 
obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Special Connection, and Bank Corruption are defined in a similar way.   Government 
and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a dummy 
variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.   Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales equals the logarithm of sales in 
US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has.  Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money 
banks as share of GDP. Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log difference of the consumer price index.  Supervisory Power 
indicates the power of the supervisor vis-à-vis banks. Supervisory Independence is the independence of the bank supervisor from government and 
banks.  Private Monitoring is the amount of information available to bank creditors and Moral Hazard indicates the generosity of the deposit 
insurance scheme. Detailed definitions and the sources are in the data appendix. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics: 
 
 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations
General Financing obstacle  2.76 3.00 1.13 4.00 1.00 4,812
Special Connection  2.13 2.00 1.05 4.00 1.00 4.632
Bank Corruption  1.64 1.00 0.98 4.00 1.00 4,109
Government 0.12 0.00 0.32 1.00 0.00 5,072
Foreign 0.20 0.00 0.40 1.00 0.00 5,072
Exporter 0.39 0.00 0.49 1.00 0.00 5,072
Sales 10.41 13.82 8.16 25.33 -2.12 5,072
Number of Competitor  0.83 0.69 0.32 2.20 0.00 5,072
Manufacturing 0.36 0.00 0.48 1.00 0.00 5,072
Services 0.46 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 5,072
Inflation 0.12 0.07 0.15 0.71 0.00 49
Growth 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.03 49
Priv 0.39 0.27 0.32 1.16 0.00 49
Supervisory Power  -0.08 0.09 1.04 1.14 -3.05 49
Supervisory Independence  2.40 2.00 1.07 4.00 1.00 48
Private Monitoring  0.09 0.29 0.81 1.46 -1.83 49


















Corruption  Government Foreign  Exporter  Sales 
Number 
Competitors  Manufacturing 
Special  Connection  0.29***  1.0000           
Bank  Corruption  0.26***  0.42***  1.0000          
Government  0.04***  -0.10*** -0.07*** 1.0000           
Foreign  -0.16*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.04*** 1.0000         
Exporter  -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.09***  0.24***  1.0000       
Sales  -0.18*** 0.01  -0.09*** -0.21*** 0.24***  0.11***  1.0000     
Number of Competitors  0.09***  0.01  0.067**  -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.05** -0.34***  1.0000   
Manufacturing  0.02  -0.02  -0.04** 0.056** 0.11*** 0.34*** 0.05***  -0.07***  1.0000 





















Inflation  0.42***  1       
Growth   -0.16  -0.16  1      
Priv  -0.42***  -0.52*** 0.03  1       
Supervisory Power  0.014  -0.08 -0.12 -0.13 1     
Supervisory Independence  -0.40***  0.08 0.20 0.26*  -0.15  1   
Private Monitoring  -0.44***  -0.42*** 0.16  0.51***  -0.10  0.09  1 







Supervision and Financing Obstacles 
 
The regression estimated is: General Financing Obstacle = β1 Government + β2 Foreign + β3 Exporter +  β4 Manufacturing + β5 Services + β6 
Sales +β7 No. of Competitors +β8 Inflation + β9 Growth + β10 Priv + +β11 Supervision + ε.  General Financing Obstacle is the response to the 
question “How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor 
obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has 
government or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.   Manufacturing 
and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors 
the firm has. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as share of GDP.  Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log 
difference of the consumer price index.  Supervision is one of four supervisory variables. Supervisory Power indicates the power of the 
supervisor vis-à-vis banks. Supervisory Independence is the independence of the bank supervisor from government and banks.   Private 
Monitoring is the amount of information available to bank creditors and Moral Hazard indicates the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme.  
The regression is run with ordered probit. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. 
 

















Inflation 0.515  0.773  0.740  0.362  -0.429 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)***  (0.111) 
Growth -5.874  -3.525  -3.811  -5.531  -16.333 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Priv   -0.092  -0.064  -0.068  -0.088  -0.124 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Supervisory Power  0.042    0.145     
 (0.011)**    (0.003)***    
Supervisory Independence    -0.177  -0.168     
   (0.000)*** (0.000)***    
Private Monitoring         -0.072   
       (0.003)***   
Moral Hazard           0.028 
         (0.004)*** 
Supervisory Power*       -0.045     
Supervisory Independence      (0.007)***    
Observations 4812  4777  4777  4812  2377 
 
 





Supervision and Financing Obstacles 
Quantifying the Effect 
 
Based on the regressions of Table III, estimated probabilities of rating financing as a major obstacle to the operation and growth of the enterprises 
(Financing Obstacle=4) are presented for the 25%, 50% and 75% percentiles (Panel A) and at the actual level for Chile and Canada  (Panel B) of 
the respective supervisory variable.  Estimated probabilities are calculated for each enterprise setting all variables at its actual value, except for 
the supervisory variables, which is set at either the 25%, 50% or 75% percentile of the sample (Panel A) or the values for Chile and Canada.  
 
Panel A: 
  25%   50%   75%   Change between 
25% and 75% 
percentiles 
Supervisory power   0.33  0.35  0.38  0.05 
Supervisory 
independence 
0.38 0.38  0.20  -0.18 
Private monitoring  0.38  0.33  0.30  -0.08 
Moral hazard  0.20  0.29  0.35  0.15 
 
Panel B: 
  Chile   Canada  Change between 
Chile and Canada 
Supervisory power   0.35  0.26  0.09 
Supervisory 
independence 
0.55 0.02  -0.53 
Private monitoring  0.33  0.27  -0.06 






Supervision and Financing Obstacles – Firms with Access to Bank Finance 
 
The sample is limited to firms that receive bank financing. The regression estimated is: General Financing Obstacle = β1 Government + β2 
Foreign + β3 Exporter +  β4Manufacturing + β5 Services + β6 Sales +β7 No. of Competitors +β8 Inflation + β9 Growth + β10 Priv + +β11 Supervision 
+ ε.  General Financing Obstacle is the response to the question “How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” 
Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy 
variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the 
firm is an exporting firm.   Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is 
the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as share of GDP.  Growth is 
the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log difference of the consumer price index.  Supervision is one of four supervisory variables. Supervisory 
Power indicates the power of the supervisor vis-à-vis banks. Supervisory Independence is the independence of the bank supervisor from 
government and banks. Private Monitoring is the amount of information available to bank creditors and Moral Hazard indicates the generosity of 
the deposit insurance scheme.  The regression is run with ordered probit. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-
values are reported in parentheses. 
 

















Inflation 0.492  0.714  0.689  0.377  -0.202 
 (0.009)***  (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.044)**  (0.537) 
Growth -7.152  -5.149  -5.029  -7.006  -18.380 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Priv   -0.104  -0.074  -0.076  -0.103  -0.099 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.012)** 
Supervisory Power  0.045    0.176     
 (0.021)**    (0.004)***    
Supervisory Independence    -0.152  -0.143     
   (0.000)*** (0.000)***    
Private Monitoring         -0.063   
       (0.042)**   
Moral Hazard           0.032 
         (0.003)*** 
Supervisory Power*       -0.053     
Supervisory Independence      (0.011)***    






Supervision and Financing Obstacles – Controlling for Legal and Regulatory Variables 
 
The regression estimated is: General Financing Obstacle = β1 Government + β2 Foreign + β3 Exporter +  β4 Manufacturing + β5 Services + β6 
Sales +β7 No. of Competitors +β8 Inflation + β9 Growth + β10 Priv + β11X +β12 Supervision + ε. General Financing Obstacle is the response to the 
question “How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor 
obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has 
government or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.   Manufacturing 
and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors 
the firm has. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as share of GDP.  Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log 
difference of the consumer price index.  Supervision is one of four supervisory variables. Supervisory Power indicates the power of the 
supervisor vis-à-vis banks; Supervisory Independence the independence of the bank supervisor from government and banks.  Private Monitoring 
is the amount of information available to bank creditors and Moral Hazard indicates the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme. X is one of 
five variables.  Checks and Balances indicates the number of veto players in the political process; Banking Freedom indicates the absence of 
government interference in banking; State-Owned Banks is the share of assets in banks that are majority-owned by the government in total 
banking assets; Shareholder Rights is an indicator of minority shareholder rights vis-à-vis blockholders and management. Systemic Banking 
Crisis is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country has suffered a systemic banking crisis during the 1990s.  The regression is 


















Inflation 0.442  0.743  0.718  0.315  -0.462 
 (0.001)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.012)**  (0.087)* 
Growth -6.428  -3.769  -3.986  -6.114  -16.345 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***
Priv   -0.077  -0.062  -0.066  -0.074  -0.105 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.006)***
Checks and Balances  -0.055  -0.014  -0.010  -0.055  -0.025 
 (0.000)***  (0.311)  (0.464)  (0.000)***  (0.175) 
Supervisory Power  0.033    0.141     
 (0.044)**    (0.005)***    
Supervisory Independence    -0.169  -0.162     
   (0.000)*** (0.000)***    
Private Monitoring         -0.062   
       (0.011)**   
Moral Hazard           0.033 
         (0.001)***
Supervisory Power*      -0.044     
Supervisory Independence      (0.008)***    
Observations 4812  4777  4777  4812  2377 
 
Panel B:         
Inflation 0.479  0.740  0.708  0.339  -0.219 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)***  (0.425) 
Growth -6.020  -3.696  -3.988  -5.817  -15.702 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Priv   -0.075  -0.056  -0.059  -0.074  -0.090 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.012)** 
Banking Freedom  -0.110  -0.064  -0.068  -0.097  -0.126 
 (0.000)***  (0.014)**  (0.010)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Supervisory Power  0.045    0.150     
 (0.007)***    (0.000)***    
Supervisory Independence    -0.171  -0.161     
   (0.000)*** (0.000)***    
Private Monitoring         -0.057   
       (0.020)**   
Moral Hazard           0.024 
         (0.012)** 
Supervisory Power*      -0.046     
Supervisory Independence      (0.001)***    




























Inflation 0.472  0.900  0.734  0.490  -0.370 
 (0.002)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***  (0.185) 
Growth -9.129  -6.305  -6.974  -8.086  -15.771 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***
Priv   -0.055  0.018  -0.002  -0.008  -0.107 
 (0.044)**  (0.538)  (0.952)  (0.784)  (0.003)***
State-owned Banks  0.099  0.120  0.114  0.069  0.244 
 (0.217)  (0.134)  (0.155)  (0.391)  (0.041)** 
Supervisory Power  -0.011    0.113     
 (0.555)    (0.028)**     
Supervisory Independence    -0.138  -0.128     
   (0.000)*** (0.000)***    
Private Monitoring         -0.127   
       (0.000)***   
Moral Hazard           0.022 
         (0.034)** 
Supervisory Power*      -0.049     
Supervisory Independence      (0.005)***    
Observations 4413  4413  4413  4413  2232 
 
Panel D:         
Inflation  0.412  0.573 0.545 0.266  -0.361 
 (0.003)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.045)**  (0.212) 
Growth  -9.598  -7.434 -7.959 -9.212  -13.765 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Priv    -0.116  -0.095 -0.103 -0.114  0.018 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.723) 
Shareholder  rights  -0.040  -0.048 -0.033 -0.050  -0.071 
 (0.004)***  (0.000)*** (0.022)**  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
Supervisory Power  0.027    0.188     
 (0.133)    (0.001)***    
Supervisory  Independence    -0.117 -0.101    
   (0.000)*** (0.000)***    
Private  Monitoring        -0.075   
      (0.007)***   
Moral Hazard           0.054 
        (0.000)*** 
Supervisory Power*      -0.061     
Supervisory Independence      (0.001)***    
Observations  4134  4134 4134 4134  1982 
         
Panel E:         
Inflation  0.490  0.770 0.734 0.384  -0.495 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)***  (0.066)* 
Growth  -5.295  -3.418 -3.774 -4.343  -14.044 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Priv    -0.086  -0.064 -0.068 -0.078  -0.123 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Systemic banking crisis  0.166  0.042  0.020  0.202  0.129 
 (0.000)***  (0.286)  (0.644)  (0.000)***  (0.038)** 
Supervisory Power  0.011    0.140     
 (0.520)    (0.006)***    
Supervisory  Independence    -0.170 -0.165    
   (0.000)*** (0.000)***    
Private  Monitoring        -0.094   
      (0.000)***   
Moral Hazard           0.025 
        (0.010)** 
Supervisory Power*      -0.045     
Supervisory Independence      (0.008)***    





Supervision and Financing Obstacles – Controlling for the Political Environment 
 
The regression estimated is: General Financing Obstacle = β1 Government + β2 Foreign + β3 Exporter +  β4 Manufacturing + β5 Services + β6 
Sales +β7 No. of Competitors +β8 Inflation + β9 Growth + β10 Priv + β11X +β12 Supervision + ε. General Financing Obstacle is the response to the 
question “How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor 
obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has 
government or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.   Manufacturing 
and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors 
the firm has. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as share of GDP.  Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log 
difference of the consumer price index.  Supervision is one of two supervisory variables. Supervisory Power indicates the power of the supervisor 
vis-à-vis banks; Supervisory Independence the independence of the bank supervisor from government and banks.  X is one of three variables. 
Legislative Competition indicates the degree of competitiven4ess of legislative elections.  State repression of media is an indicator of the degree 
to which the government represses a country’s media. State ownership of media indicates the share of media owned by the government.   The 












Supervisory  Power  0.132 0.193 0.218 
  (0.008)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Supervisory  Independence  -0.140 -0.128 -0.148 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Supervisory  Power*  -0.046 -0.047 -0.053 
Supervisory  Independence (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** 
Legislative competition  -0.066     
 (0.000)***     
State repression of media    0.079   
   (0.000)***   
State ownership of media      0.459 
     (0.000)*** 














Supervisory  Power  0.160 0.110 0.186 
 (0.373)  (0.052)*  (0.000)*** 
Supervisory  Independence  -0.140 -0.124 -0.146 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Supervisory  Power*  -0.045 -0.053 -0.066 
Supervisory Independence  (0.018)**  (0.002)***  (0.000)*** 
Legislative competition  -0.065     
 (0.001)***     
State repression of media    0.088   
   (0.000)***   
State ownership of media      0.483 
     (0.000)*** 
Legislative competition*  -0.005     
Supervisory power  (0.872)     
State repression of media*    0.022   
Supervisory power    (0.001)***   
State ownership of media*      0.197 
Supervisory power      (0.008)*** 






Supervision and Financing Obstacles – The Horserace 
 
The regression estimated is: General Financing Obstacle = β1 Government + β2 Foreign + β3 Exporter +  β4Manufacturing + β5 Services + β6 Sales 
+β7 No. of Competitors +β8 Inflation + β9 Growth + β10 Priv + +β11 Supervision + ε.  General Financing Obstacle is the response to the question 
“How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 
(moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or 
foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.   Manufacturing and Services are 
industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Priv 
is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as share of GDP.  Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log difference of the 
consumer price index.  Supervision is one of four supervisory variables. Supervisory Power indicates the power of the supervisor vis-à-vis banks; 
Supervisory Independence the independence of the bank supervisor from government and banks.  Private Monitoring is the amount of 
information available to bank creditors and Moral Hazard indicates the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme.  The regression is run with 
ordered probit. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 

















Inflation 0.445  -0.405  0.712  0.099  0.075 
 (0.001)***  (0.133)  (0.000)*** (0.727)  (0.791) 
Growth -5.245  -14.975  -3.034  -12.820  -12.613 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Priv   -0.086  -0.104  -0.060  -0.035  -0.004 
 (0.000)***  (0.003)***  (0.000)*** (0.364)  (0.922) 
Supervisory Power  0.040  0.068       
 (0.014)**  (0.001)***       
Supervisory Independence      -0.174  -0.144   
     (0.000)*** (0.000)***   
Private Monitoring   -0.070    -0.058    -0.211 
 (0.004)***    (0.018)**    (0.000)*** 
Moral Hazard     0.025    0.033  0.031 
   (0.009)***    (0.001)***  (0.002)*** 
Observations 4812  2377  4777  2377  2377 
 
 





Supervision and the Need for Special Connection 
 
The regression estimated is: Special Connection = β1 Government + β2 Foreign + β3 Exporter +  β4Manufacturing + β5 Services + β6 Sales +β7 No. 
of Competitors +β8 Inflation + β9 Growth + β10 Priv + +β11 Supervision + ε.  Special Connection is the response to the question “Is the need of 
special connections with banks an obstacle for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor 
obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has 
government or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.   Manufacturing 
and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors 
the firm has. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as share of GDP.  Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log 
difference of the consumer price index.  Supervision is one of four supervisory variables. Supervisory Power indicates the power of the 
supervisor vis-à-vis banks; Supervisory Independence the independence of the bank supervisor from government and banks.  Private Monitoring 
is the amount of information available to bank creditors and Moral Hazard indicates the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme.  The 
regression is run with ordered probit. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 












Inflation  -0.338  -0.409  -0.328 -0.516 -0.599 
 (0.011)**  (0.002)***  (0.017)**  (0.000)***  (0.020)** 
Growth  -6.466  -6.253  -6.166 -6.925 -9.684 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Priv    -0.086  -0.080  -0.081 -0.088 -0.028 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.433) 
Supervisory Power  0.090    0.202     
 (0.000)***    (0.000)***     
Supervisory Independence    -0.055  -0.040     
   (0.001)***  (0.018)**     
Private Monitoring         -0.018   
       (0.460)   
Moral Hazard           0.014 
        (0.151) 
Supervisory Power*       -0.043     
Supervisory Independence      (0.012)**     
Observations  4632  4595  4595 4632 2373 
 
 






Supervision and Bank Corruption 
 
The regression estimated is: Bank Corruption = β1 Government + β2 Foreign + β3 Exporter +  β4Manufacturing + β5 Services + β6 Sales +β7 No. of 
Competitors +β8 Inflation + β9 Growth + β10 Priv + +β11 Supervision + ε.  Bank Corruption is the response to the question “Is the corruption of 
bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 
(moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or 
foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.   Manufacturing and Services are 
industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Priv 
is claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as share of GDP.  Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log difference of the 
consumer price index.  Supervision is one of four supervisory variables. Supervisory Power indicates the power of the supervisor vis-à-vis banks; 
Supervisory Independence the independence of the bank supervisor from government and banks.   Private Monitoring is the amount of 
information available to bank creditors and Moral Hazard indicates the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme.  The regression is run with 
ordered probit. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 












Inflation  0.533  0.357  0.615 0.208 0.492 
 (0.000)***  (0.017)**  (0.000)***  (0.154)  (0.085)* 
Growth  -5.821  -6.046  -5.178 -6.185 -14.883 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Priv    -0.039  -0.036  -0.031 -0.038 0.010 
 (0.018)**  (0.032)**  (0.067)*  (0.022)**  (0.806) 
Supervisory Power  0.162    0.126     
 (0.000)***    (0.022)**     
Supervisory Independence    -0.054  -0.044     
   (0.007)***  (0.030)**     
Private Monitoring         -0.084   
       (0.002)***   
Moral Hazard           -0.005 
        (0.683) 
Supervisory Power*       0.011     
Supervisory Independence      (0.564)     
Observations  4109  4072  4072 4109 2139 
 
 





Independent Supervisors and Financing Obstacles 
 
The regression estimated is: Financing Obstacle = β1 Government + β2 Foreign + β3 Exporter +  β4Manufacturing + β5 Services + β6 Sales +β7 No. 
of Competitors +β8 Inflation + β9 Growth + β10 Priv + +β11 Supervision + ε.  Financing Obstacle is either the General Financing Obstacle, Special 
Connection or Bank Corruption. Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). 
Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a 
dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.   Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales 
in US$. Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has. Priv is claims on the private sector by deposit money 
banks as share of GDP.  Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log difference of the consumer price index.  Supervision is one of 
three supervisory variables. Supervisory Power indicates the power of the supervisor vis-à-vis banks; Supervisory Independence from 
Banks/Government the independence of the bank supervisor from government and banks, respectively.  The regression is run with ordered probit. 
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
















Inflation 0.819  0.708  -0.370  -0.378  0.379  0.650 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.005)***  (0.007)***  (0.011)**  (0.000)*** 
Growth  -4.332  -4.969  -7.098  -7.264 -6.980 -5.687 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Priv    -0.065  -0.066  -0.080  -0.078 -0.034 -0.032 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.037)**  (0.056)* 
Supervisory Power    0.116    0.178    0.117 
   (0.022)**    (0.001)***    (0.034)** 
Supervisory  Independence  -0.125  -0.117  0.001  0.007 0.004 -0.006 
from  government  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.958)  (0.754) (0.864) (0.803) 
Supervisory  Independence  -0.303  -0.298  -0.189  -0.158 -0.194 -0.137 
from  banks  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Supervisory Power*     -0.072    -0.075    0.028 
Supervisory Independence – Govt   (0.000)***    (0.000)***    (0.217) 
Supervisory Power*     0.045    0.056    -0.033 
Supervisory Independence – Banks   (0.289)    (0.186)    (0.479) 
Observations  4777  4777  4595  4595 4072 4072 
 
 






  Appendix : Variables and Sources   
     
Variable Definition  Original  source   
Banking Freedom  Indicator of openness of banking and financial system: specifically, 
whether the foreign banks and financial services firms are able to 
operate freely, how difficult it is to open domestic banks and other 
financial services firms, how heavily regulated the financial system 
is, the presence of state-owned banks, whether the government 
influences allocation of credit, and whether banks are free to provide 
customers with insurance and invest in securities (and vice-versa).  
The index ranges in value from 1 (very low – banks are primitive) to 
5 (very high – few restrictions).  Averaged over 1995-97. 
Heritage Foundation 
Checks and Balances  Measure of the number of veto-players in the political decision 
process, both in the executive and the legislature.  Average for 1990-
95. 
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and 
Walsh (2001) 
Corruption of bank officials  Is the corruption of bank officials no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle 
(2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Exporter  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm exports, zero 
otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Foreign  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any foreign company 
or individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero 
otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
General Financing Obstacle  How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your 
business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle 
(3) or a major obstacle (4)? 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Government  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any government 
agency or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the 
firm, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Growth  Growth rate of GDP, average 1995-99  World Development Indicators 
Inflation rate  Log difference of Consumer Price Index  International Financial Statistics 
(IFS), line 64 
Legislative competition  Index of the number of parties competing in the last legislative 
election, ranging from 1 (non-competitive) to 7 (competitive). 
Average for 1990-95. 
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and 
Walsh (2001) 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the 
manufacturing industry, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Moral Hazard  Principal component indicator measuring the generosity of deposit 
insurance, based on co-insurance, coverage of foreign currency and 
interbank deposits, type and source of funding, management, 
membership and level of explicit coverage. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache  
(2003) 
Need special  
connections with  
banks 
Is the need of special connections with banks/financial institutions no 
obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major 
obstacle (4)? 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Number of Competitors  Regarding your firm's major product line, how many competitors do 
you face in your market? 
World Business Environment 




Priv  {(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t) + F(t-1)/P_e(t-1)]}/[GDP(t)/P_a(t)],  where F is 
credit by deposit money banks to the private sector (lines 22d ), GDP 
is line 99b, P_e is end-of period CPI (line 64) and P_a is the average 
CPI for the year.  
IFS 
Private Monitoring  Principal component indicator of nine dummy variables that measure 
whether (1) bank directors and officials are legally liable for the 
accuracy of information disclosed to the public, (2) whether banks 
must publish consolidated accounts, (3) whether banks must be 
audited by certified international auditors, (4) whether 100% of the 
largest 10 banks are rated by international rating agencies, (5) 
whether off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public,  
(6) whether banks must disclose their risk management procedures to 
the public, (7) whether accrued, though unpaid interest/principal 
enter the income statement while the loan is still non-performing (8) 
whether subordinated debt is allowable, and (9) whether there is no 
explicit deposit insurance system and no insurance was paid the last 
time a bank failed.. 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2003) 
Services  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the service 
industry, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
Shareholder rights  Summary indicator of the rights of minority shareholders vis-à-vis 
management and blockholders 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) 
Size  Logarithm of firm sales  World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
State ownership of media  Average of percentage of state ownership in press media and TV 
media 
Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova and 
Shleifer (2002) 
State repression of media  Degree to which government represses media freedom   
State-owned banks  Percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more 
government owned 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2003) 
Supervisory Independence  The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from 
the government and legally protected from the banking system 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2003) 
Supervisory Independence 
from banks 
The degree to which the supervisory authority is legally protected 




The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from 
the government  (To whom are the supervisory bodies responsible or 
accountable? How is the head of the supervisory agency (and other 
directors) appointed? How is the head of the supervisory agency (and 
other directors) removed?) Ranges from one (low) to three (high 
independence). 
 
Supervisory Power  Principal component indicator of 14 dummy variables: 1.Does the 
supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to 
discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 2.Are auditors 
required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency 
any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in 
elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3.Can supervisors take legal 
action against external auditors for negligence? 4.Can the 
supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure? 5.Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors 
or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential 
losses? 7. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision 
to distribute: a) Dividends?  b) Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8.Can 
the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this declaration 
supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank is insolvent? 
9.Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to 
intervene that is, suspend some or all ownership rights-a problem 




bank? 10.Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the 
supervisory agency  
or any other government agency do the following: a) Supersede 
shareholder rights? b) Remove and replace management? c) Remove 
and replace directors? 
Systemic banking crisis  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country suffered a 
systemic banking crisis during the 1990s 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) 
 
 
  